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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to explore the 
relationship between the speaker in Whitman's poem, "Song of 
Myself," and the self who is represented or "sung" within 
the context of the poem. Looking at the text, the question 
arises whether the work is a predication of the speaker that 
encompasses the full range of his experience, or whether the 
poem fails to address some aspect of the poet's subjective 
being. Specifically, this question arises when we read 
Whitman's various assertions of an identity that is 
"withheld" from language - assertions that appear even as 
Whitman engages in an extended reconstruction of himself.
The exploration of this relationship between the 
speaking and the spoken selves in "Song of Myself" proceeds 
with the proposal that the reader adopt an understanding of 
subjectivity that will take into account the fissure between 
the poet who objectifies himself in words and the poet who 
is thus represented. Such an understanding of subjectivity 
is proposed in lieu of the more conventional view that the 
human individual is accurately portrayed through the neutral 
medium of language. In particular, this alternative view of 
subjectivity is proposed in accordance with Jacques Lacan's 
theoretical formulations of selfhood and its involvement in 
language. Lacan's psychoanalytic vocabulary is employed in 
an effort to show how Whitman's poem conveys the not 
entirely representable presence of the language-using 
subj ect.
As a result of this study, "Song of Myself" comes to be 
seen as a performative work of literature whose significance 
transcends its predicative dimension. The work is 
transformed from a poem "about" the poet's self to a 
rehearsal of both the articulable and the inarticulable 
aspects of subjective being.
"SONG OF MYSELF" AND THE DIVIDED SUBJECT
A remarkable division operates throughout the text of 
"Song of Myself," problematizing what is likely to be our 
understanding of the speaker and the way in which his words 
relate to his subjective experience. From the opening line 
of the poem, "I celebrate myself, and sing myself," we are 
invited to perceive the work as an exuberant description of 
the poet, a subjecting of the subject to language that 
results in a topographical re-creation of the psyche. We 
think to ourselves: these words refer back to the poet,
Walt Whitman. As we work our way from one section of the 
poem to the next, we begin to revise our expectations about 
the predicative scope of the poem, seeing that the identity 
of the speaker exceeds the discrete awareness of a 
particular poet and inhabits a diverse array of situations 
and personal relations. We find that the self of which this 
poem is the song ranges from "Farmer, mechanic, artist, 
gentleman, sailor, quaker," to "the hounded slave that flags 
in the race."1 This permeability of the subject and 
everything "other" need not, however, change our way of 
thinking about the reflective power of language in relation 
to Walt Whitman. Apparently, we have merely to expand our 
conception of the speaker so that this poem (entitled "Walt 
Whitman" for eleven years prior to being renamed "Song of 
Myself") becomes the delineation of a "kosmos" rather than 
of a self-contained awareness-2 The speaker remains an
3object of poetic representation, but with his identity 
portrayed as multifarious and unrestricted by the 
individuality of experience.
The difficulty with our presupposition that "Song of 
Myself" captures and re-creates through language the very 
speaker in the poem (whether as a thirty-seven-year old man 
in perfect health, or the immortal "mate and companion of 
the people"2) becomes apparent when we read that, in effect, 
a dimension of that speaker's subjective experience resides 
on the periphery of his song, evading the restless and 
diverse representation of people and places that we come to 
think of as the poet's consciousness. We first encounter 
this division in subjectivity when we read section four of 
the poem, where Whitman posits the "Me myself" who stands
"apart from the pulling and hauling" of his surroundings.
The sickness of one of my folks or of myself, 
or ill-doing or loss or lack of money, 
or depressions or exaltations,
Battles, the horrors of fratricidal war, the
fever of doubtful news, the fitful events;
These come to me days and nights and go from
me again,
But they are not the Me myself.
Apart from the pulling and hauling stands 
what I am,
Stands amused, complacent, compassionating, 
idle, unitary....
The reserved and idle "Me myself" stands aloof in the midst 
of the world's activity, witnessing and waiting instead of 
allowing himself to be caught up in "the fitful events" that
4surround him. Such aloofness, we may notice, contrasts 
sharply with the self who is depicted in the preceding 
section of the poem. There we read, "I am satisfied - I 
see, dance, laugh, sing," - statements that portray the 
speaker as one who is engaged in the world around him and 
who derives fulfillment from his activities, rather than as 
the waiting and withdrawn "Me myself." How, we may ask, do 
we account for this disjunction in the self of Whitman's 
poem? Is there an understanding of subjectivity we should 
adopt in lieu of the conventional belief that the self is a 
unified being, capable of complete representation in 
language (or, metaphorically speaking, of complete 
participation in - rather than aloofness from - the lively 
tenor of its re-creation)?
The need for a model of subjectivity that, when we read 
"Song of Myself," allows us to appreciate the divided state 
of the speaker and his partial habitation on the edge of his 
own self-portrayal is reinforced in section 25 of the poem, 
where Whitman addresses speech in the abstract: "My final
merit I refuse you, I refuse putting from me what I really 
am,/ Encompass worlds, but never try to encompass me...." 
What kind of a poem purports to be a song and a celebration 
of the poet's self, even as that self denies the embrace of 
language? Indeed, what kind of a subject undertakes a 
verbal fabrication of his identity (and devotes the better 
part of a lifetime to revising it), when ultimately his
5identity lies beyond the scope of speech? Is the speaker in 
Whitman's poem (Whitman himself, we will presume) capable of 
being absorbed into the representation of his existence?
And if not, does this non-absorption signify a defect in the 
poem? These questions and more beg to be addressed when we 
read these lines in section 25 of "Song of Myself."
Moreover, such questions point to the need for an 
elucidation of the paradigmatic role of the subject in 
Whitman's poem - an elucidation that does not settle for a 
grasp of Whitman's self as merely inconsistent, but as 
theoretically integrated and capable, if not of resolving, 
then of stabilizing and preserving the contradictions in the 
text.
The following passage in section 15 epitomizes the 
disjunction we have identified in Whitman's poem thus far, 
showing us in a concentrated scenario the problematic 
dynamics of this literary self-re-creation.
The city sleeps and the country sleeps,
The living sleep for their time, the dead 
sleep for their time,
The old husband sleeps by his wife and the young 
husband sleeps by his wife,
And these tend inward to me, and I tend outward 
to them,
And such as it is to be of these more or less 
I am,
And of these one and all I weave the song of 
myself.3
Apparently, we are to understand the poet's being as a 
complex and seamless web of experience, spanning the diverse
6situations of the old and the young, the living and the 
dead. We are presented with the poet's psyche as a 
revelatory collapse of the distinction between self and 
other, as though the separation were an artificial 
categorization and blotting out of awareness. The very fact 
of our being presented with this view, however, creates a 
rift in the seamless continuity of experience that is 
depicted as the poet's self or as that of which he is - a 
rift in which is generated the tension between the self who 
is portrayed in words, and the subject who "weaves" the poem 
without laying claim to an identity that can be taken up 
into the fabric of the work. Initially, the first person 
emerges in these lines as a presence that is almost 
indistinguishable from the wide-ranging catalog of sleepers, 
with the reciprocal attraction of the speaker and the 
various figures he describes suggesting that the distinction 
between self and other is in fact illusory. The second line 
in which the "I" appears, however, qualifies the suggested 
unity of the poet and the sleepers with the words "more or 
less," thereby hinting at a progressive solidification of 
the subject apart from the variegated fabric that 
constitutes the song of his identity. The final line of 
this passage (a line that actually punctuates a very long 
list of characters and events) completes the separation of 
the first person and the stuff of which his being is 
ostensibly woven, creating a space in which an already
existing self can labor in the construction of his self. 
Again, we are brought back to the question of how and indeed 
whether the speaker in "Song of Myself” can be incorporated 
into his representation of himself. And, again, we must ask 
what view of subjectivity can account for the misalignment 
of the speaker and what is spoken, given that both are meant 
to designate the place of subjective being.
Gay Wilson Allen argues that the poet in "Song of 
Myself" can be identified on two levels. The pastiche of 
animate and inanimate entities that occupies much of the 
poem is, according to Allen, the "persona" that Whitman 
adopts in his endeavor "imaginatively and compassionately" 
to become whatever appears in his field of vision.4 The 
suggested unity of the poet and various sleepers he 
enumerates, for example, constitutes a volatile and 
kaleidoscopic dimension of Whitman's presence in "Song of 
Myself," as does his representation of (and tending toward) 
a vast array of men and women in general. Allen writes,
...the poet (or his "persona") 
identifies himself with other people - 
sometimes even with inanimate things or 
abstractions - by such strong empathy 
that he finds himself to be, for the 
moment, that person or thing. Not only 
does he see all people in himself, but 
he imaginatively and compassionately 
becomes each of these in turn as they 
come into the focus of his sympathy....
As a consequence of this omnivorous 
identification, the "persona" of "Song 
of Myself" undergoes many metamorphoses
8In contrast to the volatile persona described here,
Whitman's presence in "Song of Myself" also consists of an 
unchanging identity that underlies and anchors the 
subjective metamorphoses of the "compassionate" speaker. In 
other words, says Allen, the many incarnations of the poet 
contrast with a single, basic self, serving as mere "changes 
of garments" that do not alter the character or the 
experience of this fundamental identity.6 This fundamental 
self, moreover, should be understood as Whitman the poet, 
the man who spent most of his adult life writing and re­
writing Leaves of Grass. The author who molds his 
representation of himself and is occasionally inserted into 
the text of "Song of Myself" with a direct comment to the 
reader is the true identity beneath the changing, 
contradictory persona we encounter in the poem. The 
persona, on the other hand, is a created and derivative 
presence "whose visit with his reader must soon end with the 
last line of the poem,"7 even as we forget whether we are 
listening to the invented voice of the persona or the 
originary voice of the poet.
Richard Chase interprets the subject in "Song of 
Myself" as indicative of "the paradox of 'identity.'"8 In 
explaining what he means by "the paradox of 'identity'," 
Chase divides the subject into categories of social and 
individual or private experience. The poet, in other words, 
has a "political" and a "natural" dimension to his identity:
"on the one hand, he is integral in himself, unique, and 
separate; on the other hand, he is equal to, or even the 
same as, everyone else."9 Whitman's poem is a celebration 
of the "dialectic opposition" between "the simple separate 
person" and the "vast cosmic democracy" of which every 
separate person is a component. The success of the poem, in 
fact, rides on the tension and the perpetual reinstatement 
of this opposition, as does the success of Whitman's poetry 
in general.10 The paradox of a simultaneously private and 
political existence, moreover, accounts for the subjective 
duality that Allen explains with the terminological division 
between the poet and his persona. Chase maintains that the 
ability of Whitman's self "to assume the imprint of any 
'identity' it wishes without regard to the barriers of space 
or time" propels the poem as an ongoing "transformation of 
the simple separate person into the democratic en-masse or 
community of comrades...."11 The self that undergoes 
transformation is the individual, natural self, while the 
many faces it assumes belong to the world of "society and 
convention.1,12 "The motif of 'Song of Myself' is the self 
taking on a bewildering variety of identities and with a 
truly virtuoso agility extricating itself from each one."13 
The identities adopted signify the range of experience that 
constitutes the body politic, while the being who does the 
actual adopting and self-extricating is the "What I am" or
10
the natural, private person who underlies collective codes 
and obligations.
In My Soul and I, David Cavitch argues that Whitman 
tries to incorporate everything "other" into his personality 
by writing poems like "Song of Myself." Because of his 
pervasive egomania, "Whitman could not trust analogous 
extensions of himself beyond his subjective circle. He 
needed...to draw everything into the immediate context of 
his personality."14 Cavitch attributes such egomania to 
Whitman's youthful relationship with his mother when he felt 
dominated and "unstable in his sense of self," and to 
Whitman's consequent effort as a mature poet to move away 
from the tenuousness and the isolation of his individual 
perspective and attain "contrasting viewpoints (that) are 
... harmoniously aligned." Cavitch also suggests that the 
catalogs of unconnected images and events portrayed as the 
poet's psyche in "Song of Myself" is a reflection of 
childhood experience generally, when "sensations (are) never 
simply internal events" but are "confused" with external 
surroundings.15 Regardless of whether he sees Whitman's 
poetic incorporation of the world as a consequence of 
specific historical circumstances or as the reflection of a 
universal childhood mentality, Cavitch interprets the figure 
who weaves the poem and the many images of subjectivity 
depicted in the work as different aspects of a single 
"highly syncretized personality."16 "Song of Myself" is
11
understood as a contrapuntal work in which the represented 
and the language-using selves complement and displace one 
another; any disjunction between the two is subsumed and 
reconciled by viewing the text as an extension of the poet. 
The figure who creates the text and the multi-faceted self 
who is created in the text are equally reducible to a 
conception of Whitman's psyche as omnivorous and fixated on 
an early stage of its development. Throughout the poem, the 
author's "personal sense is replaced by the fragments and 
the flux into which he himself is dissolved," thereby 
generating an "internal conversation" in the work that 
mirrors Whitman's own fluctuation between a personal sense 
and the nostalgia for his childhood experience of unity with 
the world.17
Each of these interpretations of the subject in "Song 
of Myself" acknowledges as worthy of consideration the 
distinction between the self who is represented in a collage 
of images and perspectives, and the "what I am" or the 
detached, equanimous presence who resists the flow of 
images. In the preceding critics' formulations, this 
distinction unfolds as the difference between the poet and 
his persona; the opposition between the private individual 
and the socialized, conventional self; and the device of an 
egomaniac - the figure who weaves the poem and employs the 
fiction of unity with all things (the represented self) in 
order to satisfy the demands of his own convoluted psyche.
Each of these interpretations, however, fails to take into 
account the problematic dimension of the speaking subject 
(Allen's poet and Chase's natural individual) and his 
refusal, in the context of a literary work that ostensibly 
celebrates subjective experience, to "put" from himself what 
he "really" is or to disclose his "final merit" to speech.
We need to move beyond these critics' dualities and address 
the paradox of the subject who formulates his own being in 
words while simultaneously designating the point from which 
he speaks (or from which he "puts" himself) as inaccessible 
to language. We must formulate an understanding of 
subjectivity able to explain the gap between the 
representing and the represented selves in Whitman's poem, 
and we must ask what role language plays in the dynamics of 
this hiatus.
The interpretations of "Song of Myself" that we have 
examined here may, in essence, be understood as explications 
of only one aspect of a highly ambiguous poem, the 
significance of which is epitomized in its title. Allen, 
Chase and Cavitch all focus on Whitman's song of himself as 
though the work were strictly a song "about" the poet, a 
work whose function is primarily predicative and 
descriptive. The "of" in "Song of Myself," however, does 
not simply mean "about." Whitman's poem is a song by the 
self as well as a song about the self, meaning that the work 
pertains equally to the figure who is represented in the
13
poem, and to the figure who weaves the poem while eluding 
representation - like an anonymous author who, strangely 
enough, has a byline. It is important that we recognize 
"Song of Myself" as a work that captures the tension between 
the subject who is capable of being depicted and the subject 
from whom self-depiction originates. More precisely, we 
must acknowledge that the capturing of this tension is not 
itself just an act of representation, but a performance or a 
dramatization of subjective experience, both at the center 
and on the periphery of language. We must begin to think of 
words as objectifying a "reality" of "things" (if we can 
call them things at this stage) in such a way as to distance 
the self from the "true" self as an object of articulation. 
When we begin to think of words in this way, then Whitman's 
refusal to give his "real" self to speech can be seen 
simultaneously to repudiate and affirm the identificatory 
process (i.e., self-predication) through which the self is 
lost. Ostensibly, Whitman's refusal repudiates the power of 
self-representation. But the fact that this refusal takes 
place in language - and, indeed, in an extensive work of 
self-referentiality - indicates that the poet is enacting 
the inextricable and irreconcilable positions of the subject 
as an inarticulable being and a reified, representable 
being. Whitman's refusal to "put" from himself what he 
"really" is may in fact be ranked among what Shoshana Felman 
refers to as "statements (that) function not as simple
14
truths but as performative speech acts."18 The refusal 
functions not only on the level of its explicit or alleged 
meaning, but draws into play the contextual and occasional 
significance of the song in which it occurs. Continuing 
along this line of argument, moreover, we find that the 
performative dimension of Whitman's refusal of his "final 
merit" to speech is intensified by the positioning of that 
rejection at the near-center of the poem. The appearance of 
this refusal in section 25 of "Song of Myself" illustrates 
as it were the disjunction between the spoken and the 
speaking selves and the concomitant impossibility of the 
"whole" self stepping into the spotlight of representation. 
When we read section 25 of Whitman's work, we are in effect 
reading the inability of the subject to occupy its own 
center stage.
If we wish to approach the problem of the divided 
subject in Whitman's text while taking into consideration 
the simultaneous linguistic embodiment and evasiveness of 
that subject, then we are sure to find that Jacques Lacan's 
theoretical formulations about subjectivity and language are 
useful to us as we move from one section of the poem to 
another and piece together a paradigm of experience.
Lacan's writings are in fact quite relevant to the questions 
we have asked about "Song of Myself." This French 
psychoanalyst writes about the self as a reflexive being who 
is repeatedly displaced through its acts of identification
15
and reflection, thereby suggesting a perspective that 
pertains to the one we have assumed here in our initial 
questions about "Song of Myself." The subject of which 
Lacan writes is, strictly speaking, the subject of 
psychoanalytic investigation, or the analysand whose 
conscious and unconscious mind structures the dynamics of 
the talking session in which "the patient's Word" reigns 
supreme.19 Lacan's researches in the psychoanalytic field, 
however, are germane to our investigation of the subject in 
Whitman's poem because of their more general ramifications 
for the relationship of the subject to language. From 
Lacan's writings we can derive a vocabulary that will help 
us to address the problem of Whitman's text precisely 
because Lacan's work demonstrates the divided nature of 
subjective experience and the centrality of discourse - not 
merely in the analyst's office - but in the world at 
large.20
Before we proceed with our examination of Lacan, we 
should acknowledge that much of his work consists of a re­
reading of Freud. In fact, the aspect of Lacan's writing
that concerns us most (that is, his investigations into the
divided and displaced nature of subjectivity) can be traced 
directly to Freud's analytical researches. As Rosalind 
Coward and John Ellis note, Lacan's "refutation of (the)
'given' of the unity of the subject in traditional
psychology... is based on a re-reading of Freud that
16
radically subverts the notion of the unified subject...."21 
The "given" of which Coward and Ellis speak is exactly the 
concept of subjectivity that characterizes both American 
psychology generally, and the literary researches of the 
Whitman critics we have identified.22
Freud lies at the heart of Lacan's departure from all 
theories of unified subjectivity primarily because Freud 
devotes much of his intellectual curiosity to the separation 
of consciousness and the unconscious, and to the status of 
each in relation to one another.23 The topography of the 
unconscious is, in particular, set forth in Freud' work on 
dreams, where the dividedness of the subject is established 
with an elucidation of certain primary mechanisms in the 
psyche.
Freud himself claimed that his work on dreams 
contained the essential concepts of his 
discoveries concerning the unconscious. In the 
description of the elements of timelessness, lack 
of contradiction, condensation and displacement in 
dreams, Freud uncovered the mechanisms of the 
unconscious system.24
At the same time Freud articulates the primary processes of 
the unconscious, he also brings to light the controlling 
function and the distributing effect of consciousness. 
Conscious thought comes to be seen as the reining-in of 
psychic energy; ego emerges from a scenario of displacement 
and condensation signaling the possibility of such 
regulation.
17
Waking thought, judgement, reasoning, 
logic, all belong to the secondary 
processes (of the conscious mind).
Unlike primary processes, where 
psychical energy flows freely by means 
of displacement and condensation, in the 
case of secondary processes, energy 
moves in a more controlled way. 
Satisfaction is delayed while the mind 
tries out different ways to 
satisfaction. This regulatory function 
is made possible by the construction of 
the ego. This regulatory function 
results from the process of the 
construction of the ego and its world of 
objects. . . .25
Freud's re-working of the human individual into primary 
and secondary categories of psychic being prepares the way 
for Lacan's presentation of the subject as divided along the 
lines of its own linguistic capability. Lacan thrusts 
conscious and unconscious experience onto a horizon where 
the use of language structures the mind of the user (shapes 
it into consciousness), while the state of being that 
precedes the structuring effect of language (that is to say, 
the unconscious) is repressed and buried with the 
acquisition of speech, never to be known again except in a 
fictional or mythical re-creation of its features.26 Thus 
Lacan reads Freud's mechanisms of the unconscious 
linguistically: condensation becomes metaphor, displacement
metonymy. Because consciousness functions solely in 
language, because the unconscious designates an area of the 
psyche that precedes the use of words, we can never know the 
unconscious for what it "is;" its presence is registered
18
only by the effects of linguistic substitution and 
concealment. Thus Lacan is forced to assign a mythical or 
"made-up" status to his interpretation:
Lacan produces a mythical hypothesis of 
the child in its existence before it 
becomes a language-using member of 
society. This myth can only ever be 
mythical precisely because any knowledge 
that one has of the processes pre­
existing language... are known only 
through language with its symbolic 
relations.28
The myth with which Lacan reconstructs the pre-linguistic 
psyche is a state in which the human being does not 
differentiate himself from other objects as a distinct 
entity. Instead, "the myth suggests a state dominated 
purely by the drives, that is, by pressures or forces 
towards certain objects."29 Prior to his initiation into a 
system of signifiers, the individual experiences a "constant 
flux of instinctual energy across (his) body" in relation to 
the external world30, rather than a sense of himself as a 
substantive and self-contained being who interacts with 
other substantive objects. This pre-verbal state, in which 
the individual is like a "broken egg spreading without 
hindrance in all directions," comes to be known throughout 
Lacan's writings as the unconscious. Strictly speaking, 
however, "the unconscious is a concept forged on the trace 
of what operates to constitute the subject," - meaning that 
the unconscious "is" not the egg-like state from which the
19
discrete human being emerges, but a verbal fabrication of 
that state as we imagine it to be from across the 
irreparable divide of speech.31
The crossing of this great divide into a universe of 
signifiers and the accompanying formation of the reified 
self or the ego is, in fact, a divide unto itself. The 
passage from instinctual awareness to the conceptual 
ordering of oneself and everything other consists, in the 
first place, of a splitting apart in the subject. With his 
emergence from the unconscious,
the subject undergoes a separation or 
splitting in order to find a signifying 
place from which to represent itself, 
even if only by means of a 'stand-in'
(or a sign). For in order to use 
language, it is necessary that the 
subject finds himself at the axis of the 
division signifier/signified, taking up 
a position in regards to meaning.32
This split in the subject is a harbinger of the life-long 
mediating effect of language; it marks a space within the 
self where the crystallization or hypostatization of the 
spoken first occurs. As Anika Rifflet-Lemaire writes, 
"Language in effect establishes mediate relationships as 
opposed to immediate relationships in which there is no 
distance between the self and things, between self and 
others."35 Language, we may add, establishes these mediate 
relationships first through this initial paradigmatic split 
in the subject; it initiates a lasting division between a
20
repressed self whose identity is constituted through 
discourse. In other words, we find ourselves working with a 
"division of being revealed in psychoanalysis between the 
self, the innermost past of the psyche, and the subject of 
conscious discourse, behaviour and culture."34
The division between self and self that we have just 
examined is otherwise identified by Lacan as the 
construction of the ego.35 The construction of the ego is 
characterized by two dominant "moments," both of which 
indicate the progressive solidification of the subject and 
his departure from instinctual flux. The first of these two 
moments in Lacan's history of the subject is the "mirror- 
phase," while the second of these moments is referred to as 
the "castration complex."36 The construction of the ego as 
a distinct being with a socio-cultural dimension can be 
traced in the passing of these moments.
The idea of a mirror-phase in the development of the 
subject comes from Lacan's observation of "the infant's 
fascination with his mirror image." Lacan interprets this 
fascination as "a transformation which takes place in the 
subject when he assumes an image," and as that subject's 
first step toward an integrated view of himself.37 The 
mirror-phase
is to be seen as the 'spatialization' 
necessary for a position in language by 
which the subject is able to 
communicate. For the mirror-phase is 
seen by Lacan to be the moment at which
21
the infant's first movement towards a 
unified sense of itself is set in 
motion. Prior to this, the infant is 
dominated by the constant flux of
• • • 38instinctual energy across its body.
While the mirror-phase marks the dawning of the subject's 
awareness of himself as a holistic being, that phase is 
based on the subject's perception of his own image, not as 
the reflection of a stable and repeatedly identifiable 
presence, but rather as a duplication into which the
• • 3 9 *consciousness of the subject collapses. That is to say, 
subjectivity in its mirror-phase is not yet characterized by 
the conceptual positioning through which the self and 
everything other is arranged in a constellation of ontic 
stability. The visionary duality that characterizes the 
mirror-phase, moreover, infiltrates the relationship of the 
subject with his mother. The infant, at this stage, 
experiences a speculary fascination with the mother in which 
his own sense of himself is constituted, in part, through 
the collapse of his identity into that maternal other.40 
The subject is as yet incapable of understanding himself and 
his mother as separate individuals. The mirror-phase, 
finally, should be understood as the first step in the 
socialization of the infant. For "the mirror-phase shows 
the production of the possibility of a unified subject,
a possibility which is necessary for 
establishing social communication: 
there has to be a subject in order for
22
there to be a subject of a
proposition.41
If the mirror-phase is characterized by the collapsing or 
fluid duality of the subject's consciousness and that which 
he perceives, creating in effect a certain unity of the 
subject and the image, then the castration complex marks the 
point at which unity is frustrated and the difference 
between the subject and the image is established. The 
castration complex is the point at which "the imaginary 
unity of the mirror-phase and the fictional direction of the 
ego has to be broken by the fact of difference...."42 As 
Freud first articulated it, the castration complex is the 
moment at which the (male) child realizes he cannot achieve 
identification or unity with the mother. (Here we are 
reminded of David Cavitch's interpretation of Whitman's 
egomania as, in part, a consequence of his relationship with 
his mother.) Ultimately, this complex is the child's 
realisation that the penis cannot be used as an expression 
of his desire for his mother."43 The subject's fascination 
with his apparent counterpart is interrupted by the 
prohibition of incest, which forces a recognition of 
difference and separation where the subject was previously 
unable to distinguish between himself and the other 
confronting him.44 This recognition of difference acts as a 
turning point in the development of the psyche. For this 
recognition has "a structural function operating as the
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start of the establishment of a series of differences."45 
The moment thus completes - both in Freud's writings and in 
Lacan's - the subject's initiation into "the cultural 
order," where the differential quality of language is key to 
the regulating and restrictive nature of social existence. 
The prohibition of incest and its function of 
differentiation is in fact "the all-important condition for 
the inauguration of human culture," structuring as it does 
the marriage relations from which all other social 
institutions derive.46
In our reading of "Song of Myself," we will find that 
two categories of experience introduced by Lacan in 
conjunction with the mirror-phase and the castration complex 
are very useful for tracing the presentation of subjectivity 
in Whitman's poem. These categories or registers of 
experience do not refer solely to the specific historical 
circumstances of the mirror-phase and the castration 
complex, but instead indicate the way in which these so- 
called moments shape the subject and structure his existence 
as an adult.
The experiential category that is associated with the 
mirror-phase is the Imaginary, a register which, as Fredric 
Jameson points out, "derives from the experience of the 
image," and whose "spatial and visual connotations" we are 
meant to retain.47 Rifflet-Lemaire explains that the 
essence of the Imaginary is the "dual relationship" or the
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"reduplication in the mirror," with this duality being "an 
immediate opposition between consciousness and its other in 
which each term becomes its opposite and is lost in the play 
of reflections."A8 The Imaginary, as it persists in adult 
experience, is the sensation of flux that characterizes the 
collapse of clear-cut distinctions. Specifically, "the 
imaginary concerns the intuitive lived experience of the 
body," or "lived experiences which overlap, accumulate and 
overflow into infinite successions of sensorial, emotional 
and conceptual jugglings. "A9 But the Imaginary also 
persists in adult experience, not just as the intuited play 
of reflections among conflated distinctions, but as the 
delusive insistence on symmetrical, oppositional patterns of 
thought that can be traced directly to the "logic" of mirror 
images.50 Jameson, for example, argues that ethical 
judgements, with their dependence on the polar distinction 
between "good" and "bad," are essentially Imaginary 
constructs.51 Likewise, as Shoshana Felman explains, the 
traditional concept of consciousness as an internal dialogue 
from which arises a stable identity can, in fact, be traced 
back to the symmetrical mechanics of the mirror-phase and 
the functioning of the Imaginary.52
Self-reflection, the traditional 
fundamental principle of consciousness 
and of conscious thought, is what Lacan 
traces back to "the mirror stage," to 
the symmetrical dual structure of the 
Imaginary. Self-reflection is always a 
mirror reflection, that is, the illusory
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functioning of symmetrical reflexivity, 
of reasoning by the illusory principle 
of symmetry between self and self as 
well as between self and other; a 
symmetry that subsumes all difference 
within a delusion of a unified and 
homogenous individual identity.53
The category of experience that is associated with the 
castration complex is identified by Lacan as the Symbolic. 
The Symbolic, in effect, covers all of society's linguistic, 
socio-cultural and logico-mathematical codes of 
signification.54 The Symbolic refers to language, and to 
all the other codes in society that depend on the subject's 
ability to recognize differences in more subtle conceptual 
arrangements than that of reflexivity. In other words, the 
Symbolic is the structure "through which human exchanges 
become possible and meaningful, in the accumulation of 
codes."55 This category of experience is the order through 
which sociality appears in its profound identity with the 
differential, relational network of language.56 In the 
experience of the individual, this register is the inter­
human structure into which he is born, and through which he 
learns to identify himself57 - whether as a creature of God, 
a member of the perfect race, or a being constituted across 
the spectrum of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. On a very 
particular scale, the Symbolic refers to the ability and the 
inclination of the poet to poeticize, as well as to the 
cultural artifact that he produces.
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Before we proceed with our analysis of "Song of Myself" 
in light of what Lacan has to offer, we should examine our 
expectations about what Whitman's poem may exhibit if 
subjectivity is to be understood in terms of the Imaginary 
and the Symbolic. In particular, we should not assume that 
"Song of Myself" exhibits a readily definable or even 
unambiguous pattern of transition from the Imaginary to the 
Symbolic, and back again. As a delineation and a 
celebration of the self, the poem would fall short of its 
title if Whitman did not present himself as a complex and 
multivocal being - indeed, a contradictory being. For in 
contrast to the schematic outlines of the subjective orders 
produced by theory, the experience of these orders in time 
make them appear contradictory. ("Do I contradict myself?/ 
Very well then I contradict myself,/ (I am large, I contain 
multitudes.)") The subject (both in history and in 
Whitman's poem) is not determined by the Symbolic, the 
Imaginary or, for that matter, the unconscious, as isolated 
aspects of human existence; rather, "the Symbolic, the 
Imaginary, and the Real (i.e., the unconscious) co-exist and 
intersect in the subject" simultaneously.58 As for the 
"song" (which is itself constitutive of the subject), it 
poses a certain difficulty common to all texts,
a difficulty (that) derives from the way 
that Imaginary elements may enter the 
Symbolic as signs, signifiers, and 
symbols, and, conversely, from the way
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that symbolic elements may be reduced to 
Imaginary functions.59
In light of the problem in "Song of Myself" that we 
articulated at the beginning of this paper (namely, the 
problem of the disjunction between the speaking and the 
spoken selves, and the meaning of a poem that can never 
fulfill its goal of self-predication), and in light of 
Lacan's ideas about the nature of subjectivity, it becomes 
apparent that we should read Whitman's poem as a performance 
(in the spirit of Shoshana Felman's "performative speech 
acts") of the following Lacanian propositions: "I think
where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think," and "I 
am not wherever I am the plaything of my thought."60 The 
"I" in Whitman's poem who thinks (and speaks) about himself 
and who works to represent himself in a variety of ways 
should, in other words, be understood as the self who 
refuses his "final merit" to speech, or who refuses to "put" 
from himself what he "really" is. This "I" is not where the 
poet situates himself in the poem in an array of forms and 
stances. The "I" who is the plaything of the poet's thought 
and speech, meanwhile, is the figure represented throughout 
the poem, whether as a "kosmos" or as a "comrade of 
raftsmen."
We will recall that Allen, Chase and Cavitch each 
identify an "I" in "Song of Myself" who ultimately resides 
outside the poem's depiction of a multifaceted subject.
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Allen speaks of a poet who manipulates his persona, Chase of 
a private, natural individual who contrasts with the social 
self, and Cavitch of an individual who uses language to 
satisfy his egomania. When, however, we identify an "I" who 
is not where the poet situates himself in the poem, we are 
not - unlike these critics - identifying the "I" who 
maintains a real presence outside the language of the poem. 
On the contrary, we are proposing that the withheld self who 
generates the entire poem can be found only within the 
language of Whitman's text. Even while the hidden being who 
refuses his final merit to speech assumes the role of an 
absent, nonrepresentable subject, that hidden being assumes 
such a role in "Song of Myself" only through the 
representational capacity of language. The drama of 
Whitman's poem, in other words, lies precisely in this 
tension of language, where the weaving of the depicted "I" 
by the withheld "I" is itself a fabric exhibiting that very 
weave.
As we proceed with our interpretation of Whitman's 
poem, we find that the "I" who is the plaything of the 
poet's thought and speech is in fact a dramatization of the 
ego in the different stages of its construction. That is to 
say, the represented "I" moves back and forth between the 
Imaginary and Symbolic registers, finding a home in neither 
sphere. In turn, it becomes apparent that the withheld self 
- the "self" putatively "outside" the poem - corresponds to
Lacan's unconscious, or to that which Lacan frequently 
identifies as the Real. The withheld self, in other words, 
comes to signify (in a necessarily mythical gesture) the 
underside of the distinction, Imaginary/Symbolic, signifying 
that which is repressed by the acquisition of language. As 
a result, the character of "Song of Myself" as a whole is 
transformed. The poem rehearses the distinction addressed 
by Rifflet-Lemaire in the following passage:
(the) birth into language and the 
utilization of the symbol produce a 
disjunction between lived experience and 
the sign which replaces it. This 
disjunction will become greater over the 
years, language being above all the 
organ of communication and of reflection 
upon a lived experience which it is 
often not able to go beyond. Always 
seeking to 'rationalize,' to 'repress' 
the lived experience, reflection will 
eventually become profoundly divergent 
from that lived experience. In this 
sense, we can say with Lacan that the 
appearance of language is simultaneous 
with the primal repression which 
constitutes the unconscious.61
The "I" who is the plaything of the poet's thought - the 
sung self - will be best understood as a product of the 
organ of communication and reflection, which in turn 
guarantees the repression of the "real" self or the locus of 
"lived experience." Consequently, the entire poem will have 
to be seen as a mythical re-creation of this fissure in the 
psyche, mythical because it is a re-creation in language.
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Earlier we observed that the "Me myself" in section 
four of Whitman's poem stands aloof from the world's 
activity, a separate and autonomous being. Now it is 
possible for us to read this "Me myself" as an indication 
(and necessarily a misrepresentation) of the unconscious; an 
unconscious born with the introduction of the subject to 
language and the concomitant formation of the reflexive 
principle of consciousness. The "Me myself" contrasts with 
the me who is caught up in "the fever of doubtful news" and 
swept by the tide of "fitful events," just as the 
unconscious contrasts with the public self who is caught up 
in the social and cultural symbolism of discourse.
Likewise, that which the poet is ("what I am") stands "apart 
from the pulling and hauling" of the world's activity, 
situated "both in and out of the game and watching and 
wondering at it." The phrase "Me myself," however, may be 
read as more than an indication of the unconscious and its 
absence from the realm of public discourse. The phrase may 
also be understood to designate the duality of consciousness 
that accompanies the simultaneous birth and repression of 
the unconscious. By virtue of its reflexive structure, the 
phrase "Me myself" hints at the twofold nature of 
consciousness, and the dialogic positioning of the speaking 
subject in relation to himself. The dual aspect of the 
words "Me myself" in effect illustrates the illusion of
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bipartite stability that characterizes the internal 
gravitational lock of the conscious self.
Another instance of this self-referential ambiguity can 
be found in line 75 of the poem, where Whitman speaks of 
himself as "what I am." The ability of the subject to 
confront "what" he is tells of a symmetrical division in 
being that is proper to consciousness, meaning that the 
subject has reified his own subjective experience enough to 
identify its "what-ness." Meanwhile, the space between the 
pronoun and the abstract hypostatization of the subject in 
his "what-ness" leads us to think of the space between the 
self who is the plaything of his thought and the "I" who 
eludes articulation. As a result of this hiatus, we are 
invited to re-examine our conception of the "I" in this 
phrase as belonging within the realm of Whitman's 
articulable identity, and to acknowledge the profound 
fluidity of this "I" as that which links "what" (the 
reification of the self) with "am" (the dimension of lived 
experience that is uncontained by notions of self and 
other).
In section five of "Song of Myself," Whitman embarks on 
a dramatization of the Imaginary. Here the poet establishes 
that illusory space in the subject between the "I" and its 
symmetrical counterpart, a space which (as we have seen) 
tends to collapse and reopen as its terms change places.
Thus we read,
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I believe in you my soul, the other I am 
must not abase itself to you,
And you must not be abased to the other.
Loafe with me on the grass, loose the stop 
from your throat,
Not words, not music or rhyme I want, not 
custom or lecture, not even the best,
Only the lull I like, the hum of your valved 
voice.
I mind how once we lay such a transparent 
summer morning,
How you settled your head athwart my hips and 
gently turned over upon me,
And parted the shirt from my bosom-bone,
and plunged your tongue to my bare-stript 
heart,
And reach'd till you felt my beard, and reach'd 
till you held my feet.
Any temptation to interpret these words a reflective of a 
rational encounter within the poet's mind, suggestive of 
consciousness, is dispelled by the erotic overtones in which 
this encounter is presented. Whitman is other to that which 
is other to him, not in a logical way, but in the sense of a 
sexual attraction that promises to fuse each being with the 
other. Accordingly, we should read this passage as a 
fleshly rendition (despite the poet's involvement with his 
soul) of the Imaginary phase of the psyche, hinting as it 
does at a (sensual) play of reflections.
The Imaginary sense that is established in section five 
of "Song of Myself" is reaffirmed in section eight, where 
the narrative emphasis at the beginning of the section is on 
"the experience of the image." Thus we read: "I lift the
gauze and look a long time.... I peeringly view (the
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youngster and the red-faced girl) from the top.... I witness 
the corpse with its dabbled hair, I note where the pistol 
has fallen." The explicit identification of the poet's 
perceptual relation to things then evolves into a brief 
catalog of visions, from the omnibus driver "with his 
interrogating thumb" to "the policeman with his star quickly 
working his passage to the centre of the crowd." The first 
person drops out of the picture as if more faithfully to 
represent the experience of an immediate confrontation with 
the physical world by diminishing the mediating effect of 
syntax.
After section eight of "Song of Myself," the Imaginary 
aspect of the poem occupies center stage in section 15 as we 
encounter a lengthy succession of images, only one of which 
includes a reference (a parenthetical reference, at that) to 
the poet in his discrete embodiment in the first person. As 
in section eight, the poet withdraws from the work as an 
explicit presence and provides us with a stream of unrelated 
visions, thereby generating a sense of immediacy that is 
unhindered by syntax and mechanical causality. We as 
readers become lost in the details of "malform'd limbs," 
turkey-shoots and piazza walks.
When we turn to section 2 0 of Whitman's poem, we come 
upon the following lines: "In all people I see myself, none
more and not one a barley-corn less,/ And the good or bad I 
say of myself I say of them." In one respect, we can read
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these lines as an extension of the simple reflexivity of 
consciousness, with consciousness being understood as a 
sustained gravitational lock between the self who speaks or 
thinks, and the "plaything" who is invented as a stand-in 
for the unconscious. We can read these lines as a vast 
projection of the reflexive relationship that the conscious 
individual holds with himself when he stands back and 
declares, "This is what I am." Simultaneously, however, we 
can read these same lines as a representation of the 
Imaginary, or of the fluid self-awareness that precedes our 
initiation into the Symbolic. For, as we have seen, the 
reflexivity of consciousness harks back to the Imaginary 
play of reflections in which the subject does indeed see 
himself in all people, that subject being incapable of 
distinguishing between himself and that with which he is 
confronted.
After asserting in section 20 that he says of others 
the good or bad he says of himself, Whitman continues, "I 
know I am solid and sound,/ To me the converging objects of 
the universe perpetually flow,/ All are written to me, and I 
must get what the writing means." How, we may ask, do we 
move from the pervious identity of the subject who 
experiences things Imaginarily to the solid and sound 
identity that is articulated in this sentence? If we draw 
on Lacan's reading of Freud, we can account for the movement 
as a portrayal of the subject's entrance into the Symbolic,
or more broadly into a language (or writing) which splits 
the self into the ego and the unconscious. In other words, 
the ego emerges in the act of writing, the effort to find a 
signifying place from which the subject can represent 
himself. That the poet's solid and sound presence at the 
center of the converging universe is the ego is shown not 
only by the poet's alleged self-sameness and solidity at the 
center of the world's converging objects ("The ego is a 
projection in whose apparent unity the subject misrecognizes 
himself," write Coward and Ellis62), but also by the poet's 
experience of these converging objects as writing. The ego 
is that aspect of the subject divided by language that 
stands as a representation (a projection) of the undivided 
subject, it is the pronoun that gives unified representation 
of what is a divided state. Thus we can say that the poet, 
in this sentence, experiences the perpetually flowing things 
of the world only insofar as they are mediated through 
writing, just as the ego experiences the self insofar as it 
is represented or mediated within language. Indeed, the 
poet experiences all things only to the extent that they are 
mediated by language or, metaphorically speaking, to the 
extent that they are written, for the ego's acquaintance 
with the world is defined by its attachment to other 
signifiers.
This departure from the Imaginary is pursued in section 
22 as Whitman questions the validity of the distinction
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between good and evil, a distinction whose origin Fredric 
Jameson has already identified as Imaginary. Whitman here 
examines the dichotomous nature of the ethical and discovers 
that it is a falsification of his being.
I am not the poet of goodness only, I do not
decline to be the poet of wickedness also.
What blurt is this about virtue and vice?
Evil propels me and reform of evil propels me,
I stand indifferent,
My gait is no fault-finder's or rejector's gait,
I moisten the roots of all that has grown.
As we will recall, Whitman refuses his "final merit" to 
speech in section 25 of the poem. Prior to this overt 
refusal of the poet to give himself to language, Whitman 
writes, "Speech is the twin of my vision, it is unequal to 
measure itself,/ It provokes me forever, it says 
sarcastically,/ Walt you contain enough, why don't you let 
it out then?" Given what we have learned about the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic, we can read the claim that 
speech is the twin of the poet's vision as an effort to 
identify and establish these two registers of subjectivity. 
Speech, in Whitman's lines, may be taken to refer to the 
Symbolic, while vision may be understood as the Imaginary, 
since, as Jameson has already explained, the "Imaginary... 
derives from the experience of the image - and of the imago 
- and we are meant to retain its spatial and visual 
connotations."63 Even as Whitman strives to identify and
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establish the two registers of subjectivity, however, we 
should not presume that the poet's goal is full entrance 
into the Symbolic - just as it is not a complete recapturing 
of Imaginary experience. The pairing of speech and vision 
in section 2 5 of "Song of Myself" should be understood as an 
exploration of the proximity and the tension between the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary - not as they are schematically 
delineated by theory, but as they overlap and support one 
another in every attempt to perform a self.
After we are confronted with this pairing of speech and 
vision, a fictitious voice hailing from the unconscious 
proceeds to tell speech that it "conceives too much of 
articulation," the true seed of identity being, ultimately, 
"folded" and "protected by frost" in a perpetual winter that 
will always inhibit the blossoming of the "true" subject. 
Whitman (mis)identifies himself as "underlying causes to 
balance them at last," just as we represent the 
nonrepresentable dimension of the unconscious in our 
theoretical explications of subjectivity. The poet 
announces to speech the inaccessibility of his "real" (Real) 
self to language, even while he is using language:
My final merit I refuse you, I refuse putting 
from me what I really am,
Encompass worlds, but never try to encompass me,
I crowd your sleekest and best by simply looking 
toward you.
Writing and talk do not prove me,
I carry the plenum of proof and every thing 
else in my face,
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With the hush of my lips I wholly confound 
the skeptic.
Whitman's refusal of his "true" self to speech at the 
near-center of the poem (or his sketching of the 
unconscious) is followed by a return to the Imaginary. 
Section 2 6 begins with the words, "Now I will do nothing but 
listen,/ To accrue what I hear into this song, to let sounds 
contribute toward it," thereby suggesting a view of language 
("this song") that is ancillary and passive in relation to 
the physical perception of the world. The poet proceeds to 
recount his experience of a wide array of phenomena, until 
the first person again fades from the poem in section 33, 
withdrawing with the words, "I am afoot with my vision."
Once more, we become lost in a whirl of perceptions as 
Whitman describes "pale-green eggs in the dented sand" and 
"conical firs."
When the "I" reappears later in section 33, it is as an 
integral part of the activity being described. The poet 
does not stand outside the catalog of faces and events, 
structuring them from a grammatical distance, but appears to 
have attained his identity in the acausal pace of the 
Imaginary. Thus, for example, we read, "I am a free 
companion, I bivouac by invading watch-fires,/ I turn the 
bridegroom out of bed and stay with the bride myself,/ I 
tighten her all night to my thighs and lips." Even the 
Imaginary tone of these lines, however, does not preclude
39
our recognition that the "I" who tightens the bride to his 
thighs is also the "I" who is depicted and suspended through
words in a passing act of silence and secrecy.
Finally, when we arrive at section 38 of the poem, we 
encounter a crisis that occurs on different levels 
simultaneously. We read as follows:
Enough i enough! enough !
Somehow I have been stunn'd. Stand back!
Give me a little time beyond my cuff'd head, 
slumbers, dreams, gaping,
I discover myself on the verge of a usual mistake.
That I could forget the mockers and insults!
That I could forget the trickling tears and the
blows of the bludgeons and hammers!
That I could look with a separate look on my 
own crucifixion and bloody crowning.
On one level, the "usual mistake" of which Whitman speaks is 
the belief that one can faithfully reconstruct, through the 
labor of language, the dimension of lived experience ("the 
trickling tears" and "the bludgeons"). The mistake, in this 
sense, is the assumption common to us all that we can 
address the entire spectrum of our existence with the 
detached and egoistic assessments of "a separate look." We 
may wonder, accordingly, if the poet's discovery of himself 
on the verge of this "usual mistake" signals a repudiation 
of his every effort to contain himself in words. On another 
level, the "usual mistake" of which Whitman speaks here can 
be read as the assumption, made throughout his extended act 
of self-authoring, that he can contain the split between
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lived experience and its Symbolic reconstruction - even as 
he represents that split. The mistake, in other words, can 
also be understood as the endeavor to perform the self along 
the lines of an internal division that is destined to 
collapse in upon itself. Looking at the words, "I discover 
myself on the verge of a usual mistake," we can conclude 
that the act of self-discovery, with its inevitable recourse 
to a topography and arrangement of subjective experience, is 
by nature poised on the brink of error.
The fact that "Song of Myself" does not end with 
section 38 indicates, not that Whitman rejects his critical 
(and ambiguous) discovery of himself on the verge of a usual 
mistake, but that he accepts the "separate look" as an 
essential component of his being and is willing to proceed 
with his linguistic re-creation of lived experience - as 
well as to accept the ultimately linguistic nature of the 
distinction he employs in this re-creation, the distinction 
between Symbolic and Imaginary levels of experience. The 
fact that "Song of Myself" continues for fourteen more 
sections after this crisis illustrates that Whitman embraces 
the inevitable mythicality of his project, and recognizes 
that no human being has ever been able to address the 
repressed or unconscious aspect of his existence (or the 
conjunction of the unconscious and the conscious) without 
first casting the separate look of language in the direction 
of that inscrutable domain. "Song of Myself," as a result,
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becomes a rehearsal of the human situation, which is the 
paradox of our simultaneous grasp of and alienation from all 
that we seek to know.
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